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Abstract 
The archaeological study of memory and remembrance depends upon an embodied and material 
perspective. It can draw upon the analysis of the relationships between people, landscape and material 
culture, but also on evidence for embodied performances. By studying changes to bodies, objects and 
places and the way in which they act as indices or traces of past actions we have the potential to 
understand the ways in which these changes were cited and recapitulated in the process of remembering. 
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Main Text 
Memory has been an intensively studied and theorized area within archaeology over the past 15 years. 
Out of this debate has come a variety of perspectives, drawing on a wide range of research in the natural 
and social sciences. These have, in turn, led to a range of different definitions of what we mean when we 
talk about memory and how we might usefully research memory in archaeology. 
It is helpful to begin by offering some definitions. The archaeological study of memory has been 
concerned with the material manifestations of memory and remembrance. Theory around memory and 
remembrance in archaeology has also been predominantly concerned with the operation and creation of 
memories at a group or social level. Additionally, recent theory around memory has drawn on a wider 
concern within the social sciences on embodied (saseas0213) and experiential understandings of the self. 
These can be contrasted with another, equally valid, set of archaeological questions around memory. 
How do the results of current archaeological research contribute to the construction of memory 
(saseas0370) in the present? Therefore, in this section, the aim is to discuss embodied theories of 
practice around memory. How did people in the past remember with material culture? 
Classical philosophy on memory, from Plato’s dialogues up to John Locke’s concern with the ‘self’’, 
can be characterized as being concerned with an inward-looking analysis of personal and individual 
memory. By contrast, phenomenological approaches to memory in the work of Edmund Husserl and 
Maurice Halbwachs made an explicit link between the creation of memory and the experience of living 
within a group of people. Borić (2010) provides a detailed exegesis of this distinction from an 
archaeological perspective, based on the work of Paul Ricoeur. This communalization of memory has 
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been an important influence in the way that social theory has discussed memory as an explicitly social 
phenomenon, a property of the group rather than of the individual. 
From both phenomenological traditions of philosophy and studies in cognitive science we can discern 
the importance of habitual, physical encounters in creating memory. Andrew Jones (2007) draws on 
Andy Clark’s work in cognitive science to describe the interaction between the brain, the human body 
and the world as one of overlapping ‘fields of interaction’. The mind, and by extension, memory is 
created in the embodied interaction between the material world, the body and the brain. This kind of 
habitual memory is often unconscious and it can be regarded as the foundation for people’s integration 
in their particular society; their habitus in Pierre Bourdieu’s terms. 
Therefore, in contrast to ‘classical’ philosophical and psychological examinations of memory, which 
treat memory as an internal property of individual identity, modern social theory has discussed memory, 
by definition, as a social phenomenon. The sub-set of this social theory which is concerned with 
embodied and material perspectives on memory is, for obvious reasons, the most relevant for 
archaeological enquiries into memory and remembrance. The foundations of the embodied social 
approach to memory were laid in Connerton’s (1989) book How Societies Remember. In this work, 
Connerton treated memory as a cultural phenomenon and attempted to explore the ways in which group 
memories were transmitted in non-written ways. He showed the importance of ritual performances to 
inscribe social memory on the bodies of the participants. Connerton’s work is also important for the 
connections it draws between the semi-unconscious habitual memory discussed above and other kinds of 
memory. For Connerton, habit-memory is one of three broad classes of memory claim, the other two of 
which are personal and cognitive memory claims. Personal memories ‘take as their object one’s life 
history’. Cognitive memory claims are memories of abstract knowledge, while habit-memory is the 
memory of how to perform an action physically. These last two kinds of memory claim share the 
characteristic that you do not need to remember when you learnt something to make use of it (Connerton 
1989, 22). 
At this point it is necessary to consider in rather more detail the way in which the passage of time is 
experienced by people to create different kinds of memory. In The Perception of the Environment Tim 
Ingold (2000) develops both a ‘dwelling perspective’ and the concept of ‘temporality’ to address 
precisely this issue: for Ingold, agency is developed through the experience of time and of memory. 
People dwell within environments made by previous human activity. Everything they do is structured by 
those pre-existing environments and in turn their actions create new kinds of environment. Ingold 
develops this theme of temporality by coining the neologism ‘taskscape’. The ‘taskscape’ can be thought 
of as an array of temporally related activities which is analogous to ‘landscape’ as an array of spatially 
related features. Ingold (2000, 199) uses the phrase temporality to describe a conception of time, based 
on the phenomenological philosophy of Maurice Merleau-Ponty, and which is therefore not dependent 
on particular models of human consciousness and which does not need to be calibrated to a scientific 
measurement of time. For Ingold, people make time pass when they do things: temporality is the time of 
the participant. 
One useful contribution to thinking around the role of material culture in the transmission of memory is 
provided by the concept of the ‘index’ used by Alfred Gell (1998) in Art and Agency. For Gell, the artist 
and the artwork are inseparably linked in time, in Ingold’s terms, the artwork is part of the taskscape of 
the artist. In addition, all artworks reference earlier works. They would not be comprehensible as art 
without this connection and through this link they connect the artist and the viewer to those earlier 
artworks. As they are making the artwork the artist is physically incorporating their bodily actions into 
the object. Gell (1998: 236–237) does not claim that objects themselves experience memory, or even 
that they work as an external store for human memories. Instead he borrows the term ‘abduction’ from 
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semiotics to describe the way they permit people to make ‘causal inferences’ about things which 
happened in the past. From the embodied perspective described above, then we can see physical changes 
to artefacts and landscapes as evidence for the creation of memory in the past. This can potentially 
provide archaeologists with a methodology to investigate memory claims of all three types identified by 
Connerton. 
Andrew Jones (2007) has analyzed the role of material culture in memory by drawing on the Actor 
Network Theory of Bruno Latour and colleagues. His focus is on the act of remembering, which he 
would see as both an embodied and social process, people require both other people and things in order 
to remember. Jones takes from Latour the insight that we do not need to give priority to either brains, 
bodies or artefacts in this process. He refers instead to the act of remembering arising from the 
relationships between a ‘company of actors’. Therefore, for Jones, it makes little sense to make 
distinctions between internally or externally stored memories, or even between social and individual 
memories. Rather we need to think about material culture (broadly defined) and the way it acts to permit 
the practice of remembering. Objects can act as metaphors which crystalize and index short term events. 
Monuments can index events which have taken place. However, they also have the properties of 
permitting or blocking certain kinds of physical activity. This is particularly important when it comes to 
the role of large scale commemorative ceremonies, social remembering practices which are aimed at 
creating a particular kind of memory. 
In his review of the role of memory studies in archaeology Dušan Borić (2010) follows Jones in arguing 
that distinctions between different kinds of memory-claim, while analytically useful within philosophy, 
are less helpful in archaeology. He proposes that archaeological analysis is better served by a temporal 
focus on the processes of memory, for which he draws on Ingold’s (2000) dwelling perspective. The 
first of these is the trace, the physical imprint of past actions. Borić points to the problematic status of 
the ‘trace’ as something that has been treated as both a conceptual tool but also as a metaphor. However, 
for the purposes of this argument ‘trace’ can be thought of the embodied, materialized evidence of past 
actions, directly equivalent to Gell’s (1998) ‘index’. For Borić ‘trace’ leads to ‘citation’. When people 
respond to traces they do so within a new temporal framework. So, rather than inferring past agency 
from indicies, in the way suggested by Gell, Borić argues that people ‘cite’ these traces in a new 
contemporary set of relationships. Remembering is a process which takes place in the present, drawing 
on the presently available ‘company of actors’. However, the same traces and citations can be drawn 
upon in more than one present, which leads Borić to the third of his analytical categories, 
‘recapitulation’. By repeating practices in the same places, traces can be cited in ways which are both 
traditional and innovative. Therefore, material culture and landscape can be deployed to create and 
modify memories as well as to ‘preserve’ them. 
The importance of bodily performance is clear in all these accounts of the practice of remembrance. 
Formal bodily performance was also an important part of Connerton’s analysis of the creation and 
managing of collective social memory, in his case focused on the large scale rituals of organized religion 
and nation states. Peterson (2013) has reviewed the specific importance of embodied performance at all 
scales of analysis. Following Jones in focusing on practices of remembering, it can be argued that even 
small-scale habit-memories require an embodied performance. Bodily skills, for example learning to 
work stone, are learnt from a combination of feedback from the material being worked with approbation 
from an experienced audience. What is being created in this case are indexing traces on the landscape, 
the artefact and the body, all of which will be drawn on in future citations. As well as the stone tool and 
the production site, the lithic worker has created the kind of body that knows how to work stone. The 
citation and repetition involved in these performances is another instance of the continuity of practices 
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of remembering across the scales from personal habit memory to large scale commemorative 
performance. 
Therefore, building on the literature discussed above, the archaeological study of memory and 
remembrance is characterized by the analysis of a number of important topics. These include: the 
relationships between people, landscape and material culture; evidence for embodied performances; 
transformations to bodies, objects and places which act as indices or traces; and the ways in which these 
changes are cited and recapitulated in subsequent times. 
A specific example of these processes being used to deliberately creating lasting memories can be seen 
in Howard Williams’ (2001) application of the archaeology of memory to the study of early medieval 
funerary rites at Sutton Hoo in Suffolk, UK. This site is a royal barrow cemetery dating to the 6th and 
7th centuries AD which, alongside the famous ship burial, contains other high status inhumation and 
cremation burials beneath nineteen large barrows. The site itself is on a prominent location above the 
Debden estuary, which is likely to have lain on the contemporary route to the East Anglian royal site at 
Rendlesham. Williams argues that funerary performances at Sutton Hoo would have replicated the route 
from the sea to the cemetery taken by the ship in mound 1 before burial. Funerary processions therefore 
would be both citing earlier processions and would be making the dead visible by creating traces or 
indices to commemorate them in the landscape. 
The most obvious of these traces would be the barrows which cover the graves. Williams analyzes the 
way that these barrows are structured by the indices of earlier activity and recapitulate and cite each 
other. He argues that the large complex barrows, which contain complex assemblages of material culture 
and evidence for animal sacrifice, are the physical traces of large funerals. They are widely spaced; 
which Williams argues is the result of each barrow being carefully sited in relation to existing 
monuments. This is interpreted as a way of deliberately creating physical indices of the dynastic 
connections between the different occupants of the barrows. Although there are no prehistoric barrows 
at Sutton Hoo, Williams cites other early medieval burials which cluster around pre-existing Bronze Age 
monuments, to suggest that the overall form of the pagan Saxon barrow is itself a citation of the deep 
past. 
Williams analyses the transformations around the inhumation burial in mound 17 to bring out how the 
ritual performance both cites earlier funerals and allows the incorporation of unique elements for that 
particular individual. Funerary performance would have focused around the deep oval pit at what would 
become the center of the mound. A complex assemblage of grave goods was used to create a particular 
identity for the dead. The first artefacts placed in the pit were spears and above them was a group of 
cauldrons, a bucket, shield, bowl, a bag and horse harness fittings. Once these items were in the grave 
the coffin, containing the body of an adult male accompanied by a sword and a purse, was lowered on 
top of them. A comb was placed on top of the coffin before attention shifted away from the main grave. 
A horse was sacrificed and buried in a second pit around one meter away. After this event the main 
mound was constructed to cover both pits. Thus, the mound 17 funeral would have involved a complex 
set of performances around the structured display and concealment of the body and artefacts with the 
process being indexed by the construction of the mound. 
The preceding discussion has concentrated on the ‘positive’ aspects of memory. However, memory can 
also be a problematic experience. Borić (2010) has noted the personal and social costs of remembering 
traumatic events. In particular, he has noted the difficulties in dealing with the excess of historical 
memory in the countries of the former Yugoslavia. Jones (2007) also considers this point, drawing on 
the work of Michael Stewart, he points out how strategies for dealing with traumatic social memories 
can vary dramatically from group to group. Both the Jews and the Roma experienced the Holocaust. In 
contrast to the well-documented commemorative practices around Holocaust memory in Jewish culture, 
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the Roma do not explicitly ‘commemorate’ the events. Rather, Stewart argues, Roma groups externalize 
these difficult memories by situating them in their interactions with wider society. Therefore, these 
memories are physically indexed by a whole suite of material culture associated with the boundaries 
between Roma and non-Roma society. 
Memories can also be deliberately suppressed, at both a personal and group level. There are good 
archaeological examples of this process, particularly around the role of iconoclasm in the deliberate 
erasure of memory. The Roman tetrapylon, or four-way triumphal arch, which stood at the center of the 
legionary fortress in Caerleon, Monmouthshire, UK, survived, along with the fortress bath-house, as an 
intact structure into the medieval period. Ray Howell (2000) has shown that by the early 13th century 
these monuments had become directly associated with the growing literature around King Arthur. He 
argues that the simultaneous demolition of both of these structures was a deliberate act of iconoclasm 
arising from the disputes between Welsh and English lordships over the control of Caerleon. Pamela 
Graves (2008) provides a detailed archaeological analysis of the process of iconoclasm in 16th and 17th 
century England. This allows us to see deliberate practices of (enforced) forgetting, which closely 
parallel the practices of remembering we discussed earlier. Graves demonstrates how iconoclasts in 
early modern England had an embodied and material understanding of how certain ‘indices’ in religious 
artworks acted within memory practices around traditional Catholic worship. The heads and hands of 
religious images were the most important trace or index in this process and, therefore, they were 
purposefully targeted by the iconoclasts. These fragmented images were then deliberately left on 
display. The images then functioned as a, literally, reformed index. Anyone encountering these images 
would then have been able to draw on both the original traces, their citation and rewriting by the 
iconoclasts, and the recapitulation of the original acts of devotion as an act of destruction. The reformed 
images would have been central to the new understandings of the past and the changing religious 
orthodoxy promoted by the iconoclasts. 
An embodied and material approach to archaeologies of memory and remembrance can therefore be 
seen to be applicable at both a group and personal level, to cover both practices of remembering and of 
forgetting, and all of the postulated ‘levels’ of memory from unconscious habit-memory to the most 
complex and discursive accounts of the past. 
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